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I. Introduction 
This Note evaluates the constitutional due process problems 
presented by exorbitant statutory damages awards levied in peer-
to-peer copyright infringement cases. Two recent cases sound the 
clarion call for additional analysis on this issue: Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum1 and Capital Records, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                             
 1. 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). In Tenenbaum, the facts indicate that 
defendant Tenenbaum, a recent college graduate, began using peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks to download and distribute copyrighted music recordings in 
1999. Id. at 492. Tenenbaum initially used the Napster network while he was in 
high school on his home computer in Rhode Island to download and distribute 
copyrighted music recordings. Id. When Napster was shut down in 2001 for 
enabling copyright infringement, Tenenbaum then used several other peer-to-
peer networks for the same purposes. Id. at 492–93. Tenenbaum had knowledge 
that Napster’s demise resulted from its service as a platform for copyright 
infringement. Id. at 493. Tenenbaum continued to illegally download and 
distribute copyrighted music through 2007 over various peer-to-peer platforms. 
Id. He continued his copyright infringement at college. Id. Despite receiving 
several warnings about the illegality of his conduct from different sources, and 
having full knowledge that his conduct constituted copyright infringement, 
Tenenbaum continued to download and distribute; he also attempted to conceal 
his infringement. Id. at 493–96. Several recording companies sued Tenenbaum 
for copyright infringement, seeking statutory damages and injunctive relief 
under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2012). Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 
at 489. The recording companies alleged that Tenenbaum “willfully infringed 
the copyrights of thirty music recordings” over peer-to-peer networks by 
downloading and distributing the copyrighted music recordings without their 
authorization. Id. At trial, the court found for the recording companies on both 
the infringement of copyrights and the willfulness of Tenenbaum’s conduct. Id. 
The jury awarded the record companies statutory damages in the amount of 
$22,500 per infringed recording within the statutorily authorized range for 
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Thomas-Rasset.2 In Tenenbaum, the First Circuit reinstated a 
large jury award of statutory damages, requiring Joel 
                                                                                                             
willful copyright infringement of $750 to $150,000 per infringement. Id. In total, 
Tenenbaum owed $675,000. Id. Subsequently, Tenenbaum filed a motion for a 
new trial or remittitur, but the district court chose not to address the remittitur 
question and instead reached the constitutional issue. Id. Highlighting the 
excessiveness of the amount awarded, the district court reduced the award by a 
factor of ten. Id. The parties cross-appealed. Id. The record companies sought 
reinstatement of the initial amount awarded by the jury. Id. Tenenbaum 
challenged liability and damages. Id. He challenged the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Act. Id. Tenenbaum also challenged the applicability of the Act and 
the statutory damages provision to his conduct. Id. The United States 
intervened to defend the Copyright Act’s constitutionality and averred that the 
district court committed an error in bypassing the common law remittitur 
question to reach the constitutional issue in the case. Id. Because Tenenbaum’s 
attorney failed to make many arguments at trial and failed to preserve several 
issues for appeal, many of Tenenbaum’s claims were rejected out of hand, 
though the First Circuit did provide analysis and found against Tenenbaum 
nonetheless. Id. at 496–508. Ultimately, the First Circuit reasoned that because 
the district court erroneously bypassed the question of common law remittitur, 
the verdict must be reinstated. Id. at 515. 
 2. 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). In Thomas-Rasset, several record 
companies sued Thomas-Rasset for copyright infringement. Id. at 901–02. 
Thomas-Rasset infringed twenty-four copyrighted music recordings on a peer-to-
peer network. Id. at 901. The record companies elected to receive statutory 
damages in lieu of actual damages pursuant to the Copyright Act, resulting in 
an initial jury award of $222,000 total. Id. Then, the district court granted a 
new trial on the ground of improper jury instructions. Id. The second jury 
awarded statutory damages of $1,920,000, which the court then remitted to 
$54,000. Id. The companies sought a new trial on the damages issue, and a third 
jury levied $1,500,000 in statutory damages, but the district court again ruled 
that the maximum award constitutionally permissible by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment amounted to $54,000 and reduced the award. 
Id. at 901–02. Additionally, the court granted an injunction preventing Thomas-
Rasset from using the copyrighted recordings in certain ways. Id. The 
companies had two grounds of appeal. Id. at 901. First, the companies sought to 
reinstate the first award of $222,000. Id. Second, the record companies sought a 
broader injunction that would prevent Thomas-Rasset from making any of their 
recordings available to others over a peer-to-peer network. Id. On cross-appeal, 
Thomas-Rasset contended that any award of statutory damages violates the 
Due Process Clause and asked the Eighth Circuit to vacate the damages award. 
Id. The Eighth Circuit found for the record companies. Id. at 910. The court 
reasoned that courts may enjoin lawful conduct in circumstances in which “the 
defendant’s conduct has demonstrated that prohibiting only unlawful conduct 
would not effectively protect the plaintiff’s rights against future encroachment.” 
Id. at 906 (citation omitted). Thus, the broader injunction was appropriate. Id. 
Further, the court noted that the initial award of $222,000 did not violate due 
process because of an extremely deferential standard for review of statutory 
damages awards and further that the punitive damages guideposts articulated 
by the Supreme Court do not apply to statutory damages. Id. at 907–09. 
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Tenenbaum to pay $22,500 per song infringed.3 This amounted to 
a total of $675,000 for the recent college graduate to pay.4 In 
Thomas-Rasset, the Eighth Circuit affirmed an award of $9,250 
per song infringed, yielding a total award of $222,000.5 
Considering a single music download usually costs less than one 
dollar, some have bemoaned the injustice of these 
disproportionate awards.6 
These cases emerged from the development of peer-to-peer 
file-sharing services, software with which middle-school children 
quickly became skilled, while presenting legal issues that legal 
professionals lacked the sophistication to handle.7 Peer-to-peer 
downloading services gave rise to a new era of copyright 
infringement.8 This new kind of infringement occurred on an 
enormous scale but notably without the pursuit of profit on the 
part of the infringers.9 Infringements resulting from peer-to-peer 
networks significantly stifled the profiteering of record 
                                                                                                             
 3. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 490 (noting that the jury originally 
awarded $22,500 per infringement). 
 4. See id. (indicating that the judgment of $22,500 per infringement 
“yielded a total award of $675,000”). 
 5. See Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 910 (noting that Thomas-Rasset had to 
pay $9,250 per infringement for a total award of $222,000). 
 6. See Steven M. Tepp, The Constitutional Challenge to Statutory 
Damages for Copyright Infringement: Don’t Gore Section 504, 10 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 93, 95 (2009) (indicating that “some have 
suggested that the actual damages to the plaintiffs are a mere seventy cents, a 
common royalty rate paid to the copyright owner of a sound recording for the 
licensed download of that sound recording”). 
 7. See infra notes 8–29 and accompanying text (discussing the context 
surrounding the peer-to-peer file sharing phenomenon). 
 8. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 491–92 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (indicating that “[i]n the late 1990s, copyrighted music recordings . . . 
began to appear on file-sharing software called ‘peer-to-peer networks’ without 
the authorization of the copyright holders . . . [thus] the unauthorized and 
illegal downloading and distribution of copyrighted materials—especially music 
recordings—became commonplace” (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 919–20 (2005) (describing operation of peer-to-
peer networks and noting that their advent has likely resulted in copyright 
infringement on a “staggering” scale))). 
 9. See id. at 492 (noting that the recording industry suffered significant 
financial losses as a result of the proliferation of peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks and the potential for music piracy that such networks enable). But see 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 926 (discussing financial gains on the part of the service’s 
operators). 
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companies.10 Between the years of 1999 and 2008, “the recording 
industry as a whole suffered a fifty percent drop in both sales and 
revenues.”11 The financial setbacks that record companies have 
endured as a result of peer-to-peer file sharing have prohibited 
the industry from developing and marketing new artists.12 These 
setbacks also caused the music recording industry to lose a large 
number of jobs.13  
Aiming to rectify this problem, record companies sought first 
to inform the general public that downloading and distributing 
music on these file-sharing networks amounted to copyright 
infringement.14 Record companies then brought lawsuits against 
the peer-to-peer networks through which individual Internet 
users shared music.15 These efforts, however, did not curtail the 
file-sharing phenomenon.16 Even if the record companies 
managed to prevail against a particular peer-to-peer network, 
new peer-to-peer networks emerged through which individuals 
continued to share music files.17 Thus, record companies began 
filing lawsuits against individuals who did the file sharing.18 
                                                                                                             
 10. See id. (indicating that “[b]etween 1999 and 2008, the recording 
industry as a whole suffered a fifty percent drop in both sales and revenues, a 
figure plaintiffs attribute to the rise of illegal downloading”). 
 11. See id. (noting that the record industry suffered immense financial 
setbacks as a result of peer-to-peer infringements). 
 12. See id. (“This reduction in revenues has, in turn, diminished recording 
companies’ capacities to pursue, develop and market new recording artists.”). 
 13. See id. (noting that the financial losses sustained by the record industry 
caused a significant reduction in employment and that “Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment and Warner Music Group . . . each have suffered a fifty percent 
reduction in workforce since 2000”). 
 14. See id. (indicating that record companies “initiated a broad campaign to 
address the illegal infringement of copyrighted materials” by raising public 
awareness about the illegality of sharing music over peer-to-peer networks). 
 15. See id. (noting that record companies did not initially target individual 
file-sharers but instead filed suits only against the “proprietors of peer-to-peer 
networks”). 
 16. See id. (highlighting the failure of lawsuits against peer-to-peer 
networks to prevent infringements of copyrights owned by record companies 
because of the emergence of new peer-to-peer networks and the continued use of 
such networks to share music by individuals). 
 17. See id. (noting that, as a result of the failure of the record companies’ 
initial campaign against peer-to-peer networks, the record companies then 
sought to pursue claims against the individuals sharing music over the peer-to-
peer networks). 
 18. See Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
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Of the over 30,000 lawsuits initiated by record companies for 
such infringements,19 most have resulted in settlements of 
between $2,000 and $5,000.20 In some cases, courts rendered 
default judgments against the defendants or ruled for plaintiffs 
on summary judgment.21 The courts imposed only the minimum 
amount of statutory damages in these cases.22 Although the law 
technically requires no connection between actual and statutory 
damages,23 “where it is clear that the plaintiff suffered no actual 
damages, and the defendant earned little if any profits from the 
infringement, courts tend to limit recovery to the minimum 
statutory sum.”24 
                                                                                                             
5, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/ 
05music.html?_r=0 (“Since 2003, record labels have brought legal action against 
about 30,000 people, accusing them of trafficking in copyrighted songs.”) (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See id. (noting that record companies have filed over 30,000 such lawsuits). 
 20. See Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally 
Excessive Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 53, 54 (2009) (indicating that “[t]he overwhelming majority of these 
lawsuits have been settled by the file sharer’s agreement to pay some compensation 
to the plaintiffs, generally between $2000 and $5000”). 
 21. See id. at 54 (indicating that “[a]t least ten defendants in reported peer-to-
peer cases involving sound recordings have either allowed default judgments to be 
entered against them or have lost on summary judgment motions” (citing Warner 
Bros. Records Inc. v. Tait, No. 07-134-J16-HTS, 2008 WL 2415036 (M.D. Fla. June 
12, 2008); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 06-00120-BR, 2007 WL 1853956 
(E.D.N.C. June 26, 2007))). 
 22. See id. (highlighting that the damages awarded in these cases amounted 
only to the statutorily prescribed minimum); Tait, 2008 WL 2415036, at *3 
(awarding the statutorily authorized minimum amount of damages); UMG 
Recordings, Inc., 2007 WL 1853956, at *2 (same).  
 23. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, ON COPYRIGHT § 14.2.1.1 (3d ed. 2012) (indicating 
that “as a matter of law, no connection is required between actual and statutory 
damages”). 
 24. Id. (citing Reader’s Digest Assn., Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 642 
F. Supp. 144, 147 (D.D.C. 1986) (awarding the statutory minimum), aff’d, 821 
F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 983, 988 
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Doehrer v. Caldwell, 207 U.S.P.Q. 391, 393 (N.D. Ill. 
1980) (awarding minimum statutory damages and indicating that statutory 
damages provisions “should not be converted into a windfall where, as a 
practical matter, the plaintiff has suffered only nominal damages”); Nat’l 
Council of Young Israel, Inc. v. Feir Co., 347 F. Supp. 1293, 1295, 175 U.S.P.Q. 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (awarding the then-applicable statutory minimum of $250 for 
each of four infringements); Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 
1400, 1404, 168 U.S.P.Q. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (awarding $500); Morser v. Bengor 
Prods. Co., 283 F. Supp. 926, 929, 159 U.S.P.Q. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“We 
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The tendency of courts to err on the side of the minimum 
amount of statutory damages in peer-to-peer file sharing cases 
indicates that in such cases $750 constitutes a “just” statutory 
award.25 A court must award an amount within the statutorily 
authorized range as it “considers just.”26 Because the statute 
requires not just any amount, but instead a just amount, some 
basis for the amount awarded pursuant to the statutory scheme 
seems necessary.27 This just-amount requirement is undoubtedly 
an ambiguous standard. But considering the acquiescence of 
courts to award the statutorily prescribed minimum of $750 for 
an infringement amounting to $1 in actual damages—and 
possibly even less given the middleman’s cut—one may conclude 
that the minimum statutory award meets the just requirement of 
the statute for this sort of case.28 The exorbitant awards in 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset, however, shatter whatever 
certainty existed regarding the just requirement of statutory 
damages with respect to peer-to-peer infringement cases.29  
Given that Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset are outliers, this 
Note aims to flesh out some of the legal framework surrounding 
                                                                                                             
think that the [then-applicable] minimum statutory allowance of $250 justly 
compensates the plaintiff and discourages further infringement by the 
defendants.”). 
 25. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.1 (noting that “where it is clear 
that the plaintiff suffered no actual damages, and the defendant earned little if 
any profits from the infringement, courts tend to limit recovery to the minimum 
statutory sum”). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012) (authorizing a statutory damages 
award “in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court 
considers just”). 
 27. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.1 (discussing the benchmarks 
that courts employ to arrive at a “just” statutory damages award). 
 28. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 910 (8th Cir. 
2012) (affirming a comparatively high award of statutory damages of $222,000); 
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(reinstating a comparatively high jury award of statutory damages of $675,000); 
Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 56 (noting that “[t]he jury awards 
against file-sharers Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Joel Tenenbaum are, by 
contrast, difficult to square either with Congressional intent or with the 
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence”). 
 29. See Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 910 (affirming an award of damages of 
$9,250 per song, well above the statutory minimum); Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 
515 (reinstating the original jury award of $22,500 per song, well above the 
statutory minimum). 
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peer-to-peer infringement cases to arrive at a more 
straightforward approach for the evaluation of such exorbitant 
statutory awards. Specifically, this Note assesses (1) the purposes 
of statutory damages in the Copyright Act30 and its legislative 
history, with an eye toward determining whether such large 
awards comport with congressional intent; (2) whether such large 
damages violate due process; and (3) what standard of review 
courts should apply when reviewing such awards. 
II. Purposes, Legislative History, and Congressional Intent 
A. Ordinary/Knowing Infringement Statutory Regime 
The Copyright Act permits a copyright owner to “elect to 
recover statutory damages, instead of actual damages and 
defendant’s profits . . . regardless of the adequacy of the evidence 
offered as to his actual damages and the amount of defendant’s 
profits, and even if he has intentionally declined to offer such 
evidence, although it was available.”31 The range of statutory 
damages for ordinary infringements spans from $750 up to 
$30,000 per infringement.32 To arrive at specific statutory 
awards, courts have utilized two benchmarks:33 (1) actual 
damages that a plaintiff would have recovered considering actual 
damages and profits, and (2) “an award that will induce 
[copyright owners] to create, and enforce rights in, copyrighted 
works and . . . to deter infringement.”34 Reviewing courts hesitate 
to overturn damages awarded pursuant to this statutory scheme, 
overturning them “only for abuse of discretion, or, in rare cases, 
violation of constitutional due process.”35 
Although the statute itself offers little guidance for courts to 
reach an appropriate statutory award absent proof of damages, 
                                                                                                             
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 540(c) (2012). 
 31. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[A] 
(2012). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 540(c)(1). 
 33. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.1 (noting that “[t]wo 
benchmarks have guided courts in arriving at ‘just’ statutory awards”). 
 34. Id. (outlining the broad contours of the two benchmarks that courts 
employ to determine just statutory awards).  
 35. Id. 
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legislative history indicates that courts should not reach an 
award within the statutory range arbitrarily.36 In fact, the 
legislative history contemplates the manner by which courts 
should arrive at the appropriate amount of statutory damages 
with some specificity: 
[T]he plaintiff in an infringement suit is not obliged to submit 
proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on the 
provision for minimum statutory damages. However, there is 
nothing in section 504 to prevent a court from taking account 
of evidence concerning actual damages and profits in making 
an award of statutory damages within the range set out in 
subsection (c).37 
In 1999, Congress increased the statutorily authorized minimum 
to $750 “to reflect inflation . . . and to otherwise preserve the 
deterrent effect of the statutory damage penalties.”38 
Interestingly, Congress expressly considered the problem of peer-
to-peer file-sharing infringement when increasing the statutory 
minimum.39 
When evidence of actual damages exists, courts generally use 
the evidence to arrive at an award within the statutory damages 
scheme.40 But if no or little evidence of actual damages exists, 
                                                                                                             
 36. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 67 (“A more general point, 
though, is that the 1976 Act legislative history contemplates that courts would 
consider actual damages (or an approximation of them) in setting statutory 
damages.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff in an 
infringement suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may 
choose to rely on the provision for minimum statutory damages.”))). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 6 (1999). 
 39. See id. at 3–4 (indicating that Internet piracy requires Congress to 
raise the statutory range of damages); see also Samuelson & Sheffner, supra 
note 20, at 55 (noting that awarding $750 per song infringed comports with 
congressional intent). 
 40. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.1 (“Courts will often try to 
approximate actual damages and profits when making a statutory damages 
award. Where the parties have introduced some evidence on damages, profits, or 
both, courts have used these figures to guide their determination of statutory 
damages.” (citing M.S.R. Imps. v. R.E. Greenspan Co., 220 U.S.P.Q. 361, 373 
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that “statutory damages should attempt to approximate 
the normal ‘measure of damages’ guide of compensation for the wrong done and 
the injury suffered by plaintiff”))). 
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courts take into consideration copyright incentives and 
infringement deterrence.41  
Notably, in Thomas-Rasset, the Eighth Circuit reiterated the 
oft-cited justification that “statutory damages are designed 
precisely for instances where actual harm is difficult or 
impossible to calculate.”42 In these types of cases, courts typically 
award only minimum statutory damages “where the infringement 
was ‘technical rather than substantive,’ but have entered awards 
exceeding the minimum in cases where the infringer’s misconduct 
made a larger award a ‘reasonable deterrent.’”43 Further, if the 
infringer does not cooperate with discovery requests, courts tend 
to award damages at the higher end of the spectrum if the failure 
to cooperate contributed to assessing actual damages.44 
                                                                                                             
 41. See id. (“In cases where the evidence provides few if any clues for 
approximating actual damages and profits, courts often turn to the underlying 
rationale for statutory damages—sustaining copyright incentives while 
deterring infringement.”). 
 42. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 908 (8th Cir. 
2012); see also Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 502 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (“Section 504’s text reflects Congress’s intent ‘to give the owner of a 
copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law 
render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits.’” (quoting 
Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935))); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, 
§ 14.2 (“The rationale commonly given for statutory damages is that, because 
actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory 
award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their copyrights and 
only the threat of a statutory award will deter infringers . . . .”). 
 43. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.1 (discussing what courts 
consider when awarding statutory damages in cases that have little to no 
evidence of actual damages (citing Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F. 
Supp. 1172, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (awarding $10,000—twice the proven value of 
republication rights in copyrighted article—for deterrent purposes)); Kepner-
Trego, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 138 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (awarding the 
then-applicable minimum of $250 for each infringement)). 
 44. See id. (noting that “courts have made awards at the high end of the 
statutory spectrum against infringers whose failure to cooperate with the 
plaintiff’s discovery efforts contributed to the difficulty in determining actual 
damages” (citing Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 
1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 
F. Supp. 849, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1984))). 
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B. Willful Infringement 
Section 504(c)(2) of the 1976 Copyright Act permits a court to 
“increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more 
than $150,000” if the copyright owner succeeds in proving that 
the “infringement was committed willfully.”45 Raising the 
statutory ceiling for a “willful” infringement, however, presents 
difficulties because the Copyright Act fails to define 
“willfulness.”46 Nevertheless, the drafters understood willfulness, 
within the context of the Copyright Act as a term of art.47 
Scholars have noted that Congress expected the increased 
statutory ceiling for willful infringement to apply only in 
extraordinary cases of professional counterfeiting.48 
Notwithstanding the congressional intent for a finding of 
willfulness, courts have significantly departed from defining 
willfulness in this manner.49 In so doing, courts considerably 
expanded the concept of willful copyright infringement to include 
those who did not have actual knowledge of their infringement 
but should have known that their conduct amounted to 
infringement.50 Courts’ expansion of willfulness should give one 
                                                                                                             
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 46. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, § 14.2.1.2 (“The Copyright Act does not 
define willfulness for purposes of determining the availability of increased 
statutory damages under section 504(c)(2).”). 
 47. See S. REP NO. 94-473, at 144–45 (1975) (noting that a finding of willful 
infringement should only occur on exceptional facts); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
162 (1975) (same). 
 48. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 65 (noting that Congress 
intended the “wholly new enhanced statutory damage award level for willful 
infringements . . . to be used in exceptional cases . . . [such as those 
involving] . . . professional counterfeiters”); Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (“Congress intended this designation to 
apply only in ‘exceptional cases . . . .’” (citing S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 144–45 
(1975) (stating that enhanced damages should be available in “exceptional 
cases”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1975) (same))).  
 49. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 48, at 441 (noting that courts 
have expanded the definition of willfulness within the context of the Copyright 
Act far beyond what Congress intended (citing Island Software & Computer 
Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
constructive knowledge suffices to show willfulness))). 
 50. See id. at 441 (“[C]ourts have interpreted willfulness so broadly that 
those who merely should have known their conduct was infringing are often 
treated as willful infringers.” (citing Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. 
1952 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1941 (2013) 
pause to consider the problems that might emerge from the 
activist judicial expansion of Congress’s legislation.51 
III. Discussion of Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset 
In the first of these cases, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbaum, the First Circuit reinstated a large jury award of 
statutory damages, requiring Joel Tenenbaum to pay $22,500 per 
song infringed.52 This amounted to a total of $675,000 for the 
recent college graduate to pay.53 To arrive at this sum, the jury 
found that Tenenbaum’s infringement met the willfulness 
threshold that pushed the maximum damages available to 
$150,000 per infringement.54 Then, the jury considered a “non-
exhaustive list of factors” and determined that Tenenbaum owed 
$22,500 per infringement.55 The First Circuit painted Tenenbaum 
in a particularly negative light, suggesting that his conduct 
merited such an exorbitant award.56 
The First Circuit’s decision emerged from cross appeals of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts decision that 
found the jury award unconstitutionally excessive in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.57 In addition to 
finding that the award violated the Due Process Clause under the 
                                                                                                             
Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that constructive 
knowledge suffices to show willfulness))). 
 51. See id. (discussing the departure of courts from congressional intent 
with respect to what constitutes willful infringement within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act). 
 52. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 
2011) (noting that the jury originally awarded $22,500 per infringement). 
 53. See id. (indicating that the judgment of $22,500 per infringement 
“yielded a total award of $675,000”). 
 54. See id. (indicating that the jury found that Tenenbaum’s infringement 
met the willfulness threshold). 
 55. See id. (noting that the district court instructed the jury to consider 
nonexhaustive factors in the event that the jury levied an award of damages). 
 56. See id. at 492–96 (discussing Tenenbaum’s conduct). One should also 
note that Tenenbaum had little to work with on appeal because his lawyer failed 
to preserve several objections that could have been used to argue for a reduction 
in the award. See id. at 505–07 (noting the objections that Tenenbaum’s counsel 
failed to preserve). 
 57. See id. at 489 (discussing the procedural posture of the case). 
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standard for statutory damages articulated in St. Louis, I.M. & S. 
Railway Co. v. Williams,58 the district court also noted that the 
Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence with respect to 
assessing punitive damage awards applies to statutory damages 
awards as well.59 
In the newest case awarding damages well above the 
statutory minimum, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed an award of $9,250 per song infringed.60 
In total, the Eighth Circuit ordered Jammie Thomas-Rasset to 
pay $222,000.61 To arrive at this award, the jury found that 
Thomas-Rasset’s conduct amounted to willful infringement and 
that she attempted to conceal her infringement.62 
 After an examination of the inconsistent treatment of this 
case among the different levels of federal courts involved, the 
problems that such large awards in peer-to-peer infringement 
cases pose become clear.63 In the district court’s opinion vacating 
the verdict that the Eighth Circuit later affirmed, the judge 
                                                                                                             
 58. 251 U.S. 63 (1919). In Williams, Arkansas regulated rates for 
transporting passengers on trains. Id. at 63–64. Under an Arkansas statute, a 
railroad company charging more than the amount prescribed by statute faced a 
penalty ranging from $50 to $300 for each offense. Id. A railroad company 
violated Arkansas law by overcharging two sisters sixty-six cents more than the 
statutorily prescribed fare. Id. at 64. The sisters sued, won, and obtained a 
verdict award of $75. Id. The company appealed, arguing that the statutory 
penalties violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
The Supreme Court indicated that statutory penalties violate the Due Process 
Clause when they are “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned 
to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” Id. at 66–67. The Court reasoned 
that the nature of railroad carrying, the interests of the public, and the need for 
uniform passenger rates do not render the penalties “so severe and oppressive 
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.” Id. at 
67. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment. Id. 
 59. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 101 
(D. Mass. 2010) (“I conclude that the due process principles articulated in the 
Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages caselaw are relevant to Tenenbaum’s 
case . . . .”). 
 60. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 910 (8th Cir. 
2012) (indicating that Thomas-Rasset had to pay $9,250 per infringement). 
 61. See id. (noting the judgment against Thomas-Rasset at $9,250 per 
infringement amounts to a total of $222,000). 
 62. See id. at 906–07 (highlighting the relevant findings of the jury). 
 63. See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text (discussing the problems 
of and reactions to large statutory damages awards in peer-to-peer infringement 
cases). 
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levied harsh criticism against the statutory regime permitting 
such a large sum to be assessed against a defendant like Thomas-
Rasset.64 The district court expressly called for congressional 
action65: 
The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to 
implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address 
liability and damages in peer-to-peer network cases such as 
the one currently before this Court. The Court begins its 
analysis by recognizing the unique nature of this case. The 
defendant is an individual, a consumer. She is not a business. 
She sought no profit from her acts.66 
The district court then contrasted Thomas-Rasset’s infringement 
from other cases in which courts have upheld statutory damages 
awards well above the minimum threshold on the ground that 
those cases “involve corporate or business defendants and seek to 
deter future illegal conduct.”67 The district court noted that the 
parties identified “no case in which large statutory damages were 
applied to a party who did not infringe in search of commercial 
gain.”68 Then, the district court provided an illuminating account 
of the disparity between the damages suffered and the damages 
imposed69: 
[T]he damages awarded in this case are wholly 
disproportionate to the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. 
Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs—the 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. 
Minn. 2008) (“The Court would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to 
implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to address liability and damages 
in peer-to-peer network cases such as the one currently before this Court.”). 
 65. See id. (exhorting Congress to take legislative action to prevent such 
large awards from being levied against individual consumer infringers who did 
not seek to gain profit from the copyrights that they infringed). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. (highlighting the contrast of defendants like Thomas-Rasset, 
who seek no pecuniary gain from their copyright infringements, with business 
defendants who aim to reap profits from infringing copyrights). 
 68. See id. (noting the dearth of caselaw supporting an award of statutory 
damages well above the minimum threshold in the Copyright Act involving 
defendants who did not seek to profit from their infringements to support the 
position that the award levied against Thomas-Rasset was excessive). 
 69. See id. (offering a stark contrast between the damages suffered as a 
result of Thomas-Rasset’s infringement and the award the jury verdict returned 
using raw numbers). 
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equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing less than $54, 
and yet the total damages awarded is $222,000 more than five 
hundred times the cost of buying 24 separate CDs and more 
than four thousand times the cost of three CDs.70 
The district court further emphasized the lack of profiteering on 
the part of Thomas-Rasset and stated that “it would be a farce to 
say that a single mother’s acts of using [file-sharing program] 
Kazaa are the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global 
financial firms illegally infringing on copyrights in order to profit 
in the securities market.”71 
The amount of money awarded in Tenenbaum and Thomas-
Rasset contrasts markedly from the comparatively low amounts 
agreed upon in settlements and most notably from similar cases 
in which courts have tended to award only the statutory 
minimum.72 Even the record companies found themselves 
shocked at the size of these awards.73  
IV. Due Process and Standard of Review 
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has established that 
statutory damages awards are subject to judicial review under 
the Due Process Clause even when the award falls within the 
statutorily authorized range.74 The logical corollary of this is that 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (emphasizing the importance of the kind of defendant that Thomas-
Rasset represents to demonstrate that awards well above the statutory 
minimum are excessive with respect to such defendants). 
 72. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (highlighting 
comparatively small settlements and the tendency of courts to award only the 
statutory minimum). 
 73. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 58 (noting that “[e]ven the 
victorious record labels agree” that such awards are “stunningly huge” (citing 
Ben Sheffner, Sony BMG Attorney: ‘We Were Shocked’ by Size of Verdict; 
Concedes $1.92 Million, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS (June 20, 2009), http://copy 
rightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/06/sony-bmg-attorney-we-were-shocked-
by.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (indicating that the general counsel of Sony 
BMG said that they “were shocked . . . [and] . . . suspected [that they] were 
going to win, but . . . thought [the jury] would come in with a lower number” 
(quoting Press Release, Columbia Law Sch., Aggressive Pursuit of Illegal File-
Sharers Defended by Top Music-Industry Lawyer (June 20, 2009))))) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (noting that 
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a statutorily authorized damages award is not per se 
constitutional because it falls within the statutorily permissible 
range.75 Although one may rely upon Tenenbaum and Thomas-
Rasset to support a contrary proposition, the controversial 
character of these cases suggests that a more demanding 
standard of review ought to apply to peer-to-peer infringement 
cases.76 Indeed, authority splits on what standard of review 
should generally apply to statutory damages cases.77 
                                                                                                             
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits “the power of the 
states to prescribe penalties”). 
 75. See id. (indicating that the Due Process Clause prevents penalties “so 
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and 
obviously unreasonable” (citations omitted)). 
 76. See supra notes 52–75 and accompanying text (discussing the 
controversy surrounding the holdings in Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset). 
 77. See Sony Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 101 (D. Mass. 
2010) (noting that a split of authority exists as to what standard applies to 
assessing whether a statutory damages award violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, 
Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a total statutory damages 
award of $806,000 for infringement of twenty-six copyrighted works under 
Williams after noting that the applicability of the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damages jurisprudence to statutory damages was questionable)); Murray v. 
GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting in dictum 
that statutory damages awarded under the Fair Credit Reporting Act would be 
subject to review under State Farm); Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 
F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dictum that the aggregation of statutory 
damages in a class action under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
might raise due process concerns under Gore and State Farm); Romano v. U-
Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 672–74 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Gore to a punitive 
damages award in a Title VII employment discrimination action even though the 
award was subject to a statutory cap); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc 
Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952 JW, slip op. at 25 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
that defendants’ reliance on Gore in challenging a statutory damages award was 
“misplaced”); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Onlinenic, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 
WL 2706393, at *6–9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (concluding that “it is highly 
doubtful” that Gore and State Farm “apply to statutory damages awards” but 
admitting that certain principles announced in the Supreme Court’s recent 
punitive damages cases, such as the principle that a defendant should not be 
punished “for wrongful acts other than . . . those committed against the plaintiff,” 
might apply in statutory damages cases); Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner 
Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (suggesting in 
dictum that State Farm might provide grounds for remitting statutory damages 
awarded under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Leiber v. 
Bertelsmann AG (In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation), No. C MDL-00-1369 
MHP, C 04-1671 MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) 
(suggesting in dictum that the court would apply Gore and State Farm in 
considering whether statutory damages for copyright infringement were 
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A. Discussing the Williams Standard 
In Williams, the Supreme Court established the standard of 
review applied to statutory damages awards under the Due 
Process Clause that persists today.78 Williams concerned a 
lawsuit between a railroad company and two sisters.79 The sisters 
sued the railroad company for overcharging them by $.66 in 
violation of the fare prescribed by statute.80 Under an Arkansas 
statute, the jury was permitted to award between $50 and $300 
per overcharge.81 The plaintiffs prevailed in their suit, obtaining 
a verdict of $75, nearly 114 times the overcharge.82 The railroad 
                                                                                                             
unconstitutionally excessive); Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless 
Pers. Commc’ns, L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 808–09 (M.D. La. 2004) (refusing to 
apply Gore and State Farm in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes 
providing statutory damages for plaintiffs who have received junk faxes because 
the statutes’ provision of damages ranges obviated Gore and State Farm’s “fair 
notice” concerns); DirecTV, Inc. v. Cantu, No. SA-04-cv-136-RF, 2004 WL 
2623932, at *4–5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004) (refusing to apply the Gore 
guideposts to a state statutory damages remedy since the civil penalties that the 
defendant might face were capped by statute and thus did not implicate Gore’s 
“fair notice” concerns); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 
2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to apply the Gore guideposts in evaluating 
the constitutionality of a statutory damages award in a copyright infringement 
case); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright 
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 491–97 (2009) 
(arguing that statutory damages awards for copyright infringement should be 
subject to analysis under the Gore guideposts); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly 
Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling 
Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 536–56 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damages jurisprudence applies to the aggregation of multiple statutory damages 
awards in file-sharing cases))).  
 78. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919) 
(noting the standard of review that applies to statutory damages awards when 
examined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 79. See id. at 64 (noting that a railroad company “demanded and collected 
66 cents more than the prescribed fare from each of two sisters carried over part 
of its line” and that the passengers subsequently sued for this overcharge). 
 80. See id. (indicating that the sisters sued the railroad company for 
overcharging them by 66 cents in violation of state law). 
 81. See id. at 64–65 (“By a statute of Arkansas, regulating rates for the 
transportation of passengers . . . any railroad company that demands or collects 
a greater compensation than the statute prescribes is subjected for every such 
offense to a penalty of not less than fifty dollars nor more than three hundred 
dollars . . . .” (quotations omitted)). 
 82. See id. at 64 (noting that the passengers in this suit “obtained 
judgments against the company for the overcharge, a penalty of seventy-five 
1958 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1941 (2013) 
company appealed, alleging that the large sum awarded violated 
the Due Process Clause.83 Notwithstanding the disparity between 
the harm suffered and damages levied, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “its validity is not to be tested in that way.”84 
Instead, the Court indicated that when the penalty “is considered 
with due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless 
opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for 
securing uniform adherence to established passenger rates,” it 
does not violate the Due Process Clause.85 In evaluating the 
railroad company’s claim, the Supreme Court established that an 
award of statutory damages violates the Due Process Clause only 
if “the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be 
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously 
unreasonable.”86 On these facts, this standard was not met.87 
Although Williams created a standard of review for 
determining whether a statutory damages award violates due 
process, reviewing courts apply this standard with extreme 
deference.88 Indeed, the Supreme Court expressed reluctance to 
                                                                                                             
dollars”). 
 83. See id. (highlighting the railroad company’s argument that the 
damages awarded violate the Due Process Clause). 
 84. See id. at 67 (noting that the possibility for immense disparity between 
a verdict rendered and damages sustained does not automatically render such 
an award unconstitutional because other factors require consideration). 
 85. See id. (suggesting that the railroad industry and the concerns of the 
public incident to that industry merit consideration in assessing the validity of 
such awards within this statutory scheme). 
 86. See id. at 66–67 (articulating the standard applied to the judicial 
review of damages awarded pursuant to a statutory damages scheme to 
evaluate whether the award contravenes the Due Process Clause). 
 87. See id. at 67 (affirming the award under the Supreme Court’s standard 
of review and thus consistent with the Due Process Clause). 
 88. See Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting that review under the Williams standard “is 
extraordinarily deferential—even more so than in cases applying abuse-of-
discretion review”); see also Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase 
Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) (indicating that courts 
review statutory damages awards with high deference); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Star Amusements, Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 487–88 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Video 
Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
“[t]he district court is accorded wide and almost exclusive discretion in 
determining the size of the statutory damage award”); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. 
Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D. Md. 2004) (“Congress’ exercise of 
its Constitutional authority to regulate copyrights is entitled to substantial 
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review statutory damages awards with more heightened scrutiny 
because Congress granted to juries the discretion to determine 
the appropriate award within a “statutory yardstick.”89 As a 
result of this deferential application, courts tend not to overturn 
statutory damages awards under Williams.90 Given this highly 
deferential orientation of courts with respect to reviewing 
statutory damages awards, record companies seem to have the 
law on their side when they win a large verdict within the 
statutory scheme of the Copyright Act.91 In a highly formalistic 
sense, the law most directly on point supports leaving such 
awards unscathed by judicial review in spite of the potential for 
sums exceeding far beyond the $0.99 of damages per 
infringement suffered.92 
Because of the deference with which courts apply the 
Williams standard, litigants challenging large awards in peer-to-
peer infringement cases turn to the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damages jurisprudence for guidance.93 Troubled by the disparity 
between actual damages suffered and damages awarded, 
advocates for a more demanding standard of review appear to 
                                                                                                             
deference.”); Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 153, 202 (1999) (“No reported decision has reduced a litigated award 
that was within the appropriate statutory range.”). 
 89. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (indicating that a 
highly deferential standard of review will apply to assessing statutory damages 
awards because Congress set the parameters of the award by a “statutory 
yardstick”). 
 90. See Murphy, supra note 88, at 202 (noting that “[n]o reported decision 
has reduced a litigated award that was within the appropriate statutory 
range”). 
 91. See supra notes 78–90 and accompanying text (discussing the 
parameters of the standard of review that courts apply when assessing the 
constitutionality of damages awarded pursuant to a statutory scheme). 
 92. See supra notes 78–91 and accompanying text (noting that the law most 
directly on point regarding review of statutory damages supports a highly 
deferential standard of review which suggests that advocates for a more 
demanding standard of review seek a change in law with respect to this issue). 
 93. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (“Thomas-Rasset urges us to consider instead [of the Williams 
standard] the ‘guideposts’ announced by the Supreme Court for the review of 
punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause.”); Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 509 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Tenenbaum 
separately argued the award was unconstitutionally excessive under the 
standard for reviewing punitive damage awards articulated in Gore.”). 
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argue for a change in the way that courts review statutory 
damages awards in the context of peer-to-peer infringement 
cases.94 This position is a sensible one.95 After all, it seems 
misguided to apply a standard of review to peer-to-peer 
infringement cases that developed well before the advent of the 
Internet, word processing, and personal computers.96 Therefore, 
this call for a change in the law on the part of both litigants and 
academics merits consideration.97 
B. Discussing the Support for Applying Punitive Damages 
Jurisprudence to Statutory Damages 
Arguments for a more rigorous constitutional assessment of 
statutory damages awards analogically employ the Supreme 
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence.98 Indeed, in her petition 
for certiorari, Thomas-Rasset commences assessment of the 
award levied against her by invoking punitive damages 
analogically: 
Statutory damages imposed in this way are unpredictable, 
unconstrained, and equally as punitive as punitive damages; 
the jury’s role in imposing them is even more divorced from 
finding facts, from deciding what happened, than it is in 
imposing punitive damages. The order-of-magnitude difference 
between the verdicts in this case, $222,000 in the first trial, 
$1,920,000 in the second trial, and $1,500,000 in the third 
trial, demonstrates this. The verdicts are unpredictable and, in 
a deeper sense, arbitrary; they are not tied to any fact or 
                                                                                                             
 94. See infra notes 98–118 and accompanying text (discussing arguments 
that support a more rigorous review of statutory damages awards). 
 95. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 508 (noting that the district court agreed 
with Tenenbaum that the Gore standard should apply to assess the due process 
problems presented by the amount of damages awarded in his case). 
 96. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 63 (1919) 
(indicating that the Supreme Court decided this case in 1919, a time long before 
Al Gore invented the Internet). 
 97. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (noting the controversy 
surrounding a change in the standard reviewing courts should apply in 
assessing the constitutionality of statutory damages awards). 
 98. See infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text (noting the use of the 
Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence in such arguments). 
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rationale that justifies them, that explains why the law 
imposes this particular penalty on this particular defendant.99 
The constitutional standard for assessing punitive damages 
awards begins with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.100 
                                                                                                             
 99. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Thomas-Rasset v. Capitol 
Records, Inc., No. 12-715 (Dec. 10, 2012). 
 100. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In Gore, Gore, an Alabama consumer, purchased a 
BMW sports sedan from a BMW dealer in Alabama. Id. at 563. Nine months 
after driving the car, Gore sought to have the car detailed and learned that the 
car had been repainted. Id. Gore sued BMW for suppressing a material fact by 
failing to disclose the repainting. Id. At trial, BMW noted that it had a policy 
regarding damage incurred by vehicles during transportation or manufacture. 
Id. If the cost of the repair exceeded 3% of the car’s retail price, the company 
serviced the car and sold it as used. Id. But if it did not exceed 3%, then BMW 
repaired it and sold it as new without informing the dealer that any repairs 
occurred. Id. at 563–64. The cost to repaint the sedan that Gore purchased 
amounted to $601.37, only 1.5% of its retail price. Id. at 564. Gore prayed for 
$4,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. Gore arrived 
at the punitive figure by introducing evidence that BMW had sold nearly 1,000 
refinished cars as new since 1983. Id. The jury found for Gore and awarded 
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 
565. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected BMW’s claim that the 
award was unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 566. Nevertheless, the Alabama 
Supreme Court found that the jury calculated punitive damages incorrectly 
because the jury considered conduct in other jurisdictions. Id. at 567. Given this 
error, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive damages award to 
$2,000,000. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to 
illuminate the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally 
excessive awards of punitive damages.” Id. at 568 (quotations omitted). The 
Supreme Court affirmed, based on principles of state comity and sovereignty, 
that states may not levy sanctions against a tortfeasor for that tortfeasor’s 
lawful conduct occurring in other states. Id. at 572. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that while Alabama may sanction BMW for conduct occurring within 
Alabama, it may not infringe on policy choices of other states. Id. Therefore, the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to disregard BMW’s out-of-state conduct was 
proper. Id. Next, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the award 
levied was nonetheless unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 574. To answer this 
question, the Supreme Court articulated three guideposts that courts must use 
to assess whether a punitive damages award exceeds the constitutional 
maximum: the degree of reprehensibility, the disparity between harm suffered 
and the punitive damages award, and the difference between the amount 
imposed and the civil damages available in similar cases. Id. at 575. The 
Supreme Court noted that BMW exhibited no “egregiously improper conduct,” 
thus BMW’s conduct had a low degree of reprehensibility. Id. at 580. Further, 
while the Supreme Court avoided offering a discrete mathematical formula to 
determine constitutionally permissible ratios of punitive damages vis-à-vis 
actual harm, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 
500 to 1 . . . the award must surely raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.” Id. at 
582–83 (quotations omitted). Finally, the Supreme Court highlighted that the 
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Gore established three guideposts for courts to employ when 
evaluating whether a punitive damages award exceeds the 
constitutionally permissible amount.101 These three guideposts 
include the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the ratio 
of punitive damages awarded to actual harm, and the difference 
between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties 
imposed or authorized in similar cases.102  
Those who argue for some kind of application of Gore caselaw 
to statutory damages contend that the same considerations for a 
due process limit on punitive damages apply to statutory 
damages.103 The overriding rationale for applying the Gore 
standard emerges from a concern over excessive penalties.104 
After all, if Gore had not involved such a facially excessive award, 
it is difficult to imagine what impetus would have existed for 
appellate litigation.105 
Copyright infringement cases involving peer-to-peer music 
sharing in which the plaintiffs elect for statutory damages 
manifest the problem of excessiveness in prominent form.106 The 
$750 minimum statutory award greatly exceeds the actual 
damages of less than $1 caused by the infringement of one 
                                                                                                             
civil penalties available amounted to only $2,500 in Alabama, and in other 
states maximum civil penalties can range from $5,000–$10,000. Id. at 584. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the $2,000,000 in punitive damages 
awarded by Alabama exceeded the constitutional limit. Id. at 585–86. 
 101. See id. at 574–75 (noting the three guideposts that the Supreme Court 
used to find Gore’s award unconstitutionally excessive included the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendants conduct, the disparity between the punitive 
damages awarded and actual harm suffered, and the civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in similar cases). 
 102. See id. (listing the three guideposts that the Supreme Court employed 
in Gore to find the award unconstitutionally excessive). 
 103. See, e.g., Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 66–67 (noting the 
similarities between due process issues in statutory and punitive damages 
cases). 
 104. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 (noting that “elementary notions of fairness” 
can constitutionally limit the severity of a penalty that a state can impose on a 
defendant). 
 105. See id. at 562–63 (noting that the issue in the case concerned whether 
the punitive damages award exceeded the constitutional limit). 
 106. See infra notes 107–18 and accompanying text (discussing the problems 
that excessive damages presents in the context of peer-to-peer infringement 
cases). 
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song.107 Further, the amount awarded in a given case may rise to 
$150,000 per infringement for willful infringements.108 This 
means that a jury could penalize a defendant in a peer-to-peer 
infringement case $150,000 per downloaded song. 
Furthermore, proponents of Gore’s application to statutory 
damages note that juries can render both punitive and statutory 
damages awards in equally arbitrary and uncertain manners.109 
In this vein, the Supreme Court has expressed concern over the 
constitutional due process issues presented by arbitrary and 
inconsistent assessments of punitive and statutory damages.110 
Notably, the constitutional problems of arbitrariness and 
imprecision in punitive damages cases emerge not from concerns 
peculiar to punitive damages, but stem from their assessment in 
a civil trial without the protections that a criminal trial would 
afford.111 Empirically, inconsistent application of statutory 
damages in peer-to-peer cases, as Thomas-Rasset highlighted in 
her petition for writ of certiorari, supports this position.112 Thus, 
drawing a formalistic distinction between punitive damages and 
statutory damages for purposes of determining the standard of 
review is ill-founded, for both present the same due process 
concerns of arbitrariness and uncertainty.113 
                                                                                                             
 107. See infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text (noting that the 
statutory minimum amount of damages exceeds the actual damages caused by 
the infringement). 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 109. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 54–56 (noting examples of 
cases inconsistently applying the statutory damages provision of the Copyright 
Act). 
 110. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008) (“The real 
problem . . . is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”). 
 111. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 
(2003) (“[D]efendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been 
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding. This increases our 
concerns over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages are 
administered.”). 
 112. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 14 (noting the 
inconsistency, unpredictability, and arbitrariness of statutory damages 
assessments (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 
913, 959–60 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the chilling effects imposed 
upon those who innovate from copyrighted technology); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 520 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same))). 
 113. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (discussing the similar 
constitutional due process problems that statutory and punitive damages 
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Proponents of applying the Gore standard to statutory 
damages also argue that statutory damages and punitive 
damages serve the same aims and purposes.114 As punitive 
damages serve retributive and deterrent functions, statutory 
damages serve these functions as well. Indeed, the literature 
abounds with arguments that statutory damages have a 
deterrent purpose.115 Furthermore, authority exists for the 
proposition that the Copyright Act’s higher level of statutory 
damages for willful infringement functions punitively.116 And 
many courts have acknowledged that statutory damages serve a 
punitive purpose.117 Given these similarities with respect to the 
                                                                                                             
awards present). 
 114. See Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant 
Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement 
Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059, 3086–87 (2010) (offering an overview of the 
reasons that scholars and other commentators set forth for explaining how 
statutory and punitive damages serve similar purposes (citing Defendant’s 
Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur at 5–7, Capitol 
Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-cv-1497 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2007) 
(discussing the punitive nature of statutory awards); Samuelson & Sheffner, 
supra note 20, at 59 (delineating the purposes of statutory damages); Samuelson 
& Wheatland, supra note 48, at 460–61 (noting that courts have interpreted 
statutory damages for copyright infringement to be punitive))). 
 115. See Morrissey supra note 114, at 3070–72 and accompanying text 
(noting that statutory damages for willful infringement serve a deterrent 
function). 
 116. See id. at 3087 (noting that “[c]ourts have consistently acknowledged 
that deterring future infringement is a primary goal of the statute” (citing F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) (noting that 
statutory damages serve “to discourage wrongful conduct”); St. Luke’s Cataract 
& Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that deterrence plays a role in determining the award of statutory damages)); 
see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[D]eterrence is a 
purpose of punishment.”); Nat’l Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 
131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (indicating that statutory 
damages punish defendants in pursuit of a deterrent function (citations 
omitted)). 
 117. See On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The 
purpose of punitive damages—to punish and prevent malicious conduct—is 
generally achieved under the Copyright Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c)(2), which allow increases to an award of statutory damages in cases of 
willful infringement.” (citing 4 NIMMER § 14.02[B], at 14-23 to 24)); Cass Cnty. 
Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
statutory damages serve punitive purposes). 
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aims of punitive and statutory damages, many contend that a 
similar constitutional standard of review is proper.118 
C. Discussing the Support for Not Applying Punitive Damages 
Jurisprudence to Statutory Damages 
Those who support the application of punitive damages 
jurisprudence to statutory damages maintain that distinguishing 
between the two for purposes of constitutional review lacks any 
basis in reason.119 They contend that any difference between the 
two is negligibly formal; in purposes and effects, statutory and 
punitive damages are substantively the same.120 But those who 
maintain that a constitutional distinction should persist between 
statutory and punitive damages argue that the distinction has 
well-founded bases.121 Arguments against an application of 
punitive damages jurisprudence to statutory damages insist that 
the disparate treatment between the two flows from inherent and 
meaningful differences between them.122 Notably, the 
Department of Justice recently filed a brief with the Supreme 
Court concerning Thomas-Rasset’s petition for writ of certiorari 
arguing that “because Gore’s due process standard serves 
purposes unique to the review of a jury’s award of punitive 
damages, it cannot coher[e]ntly be applied to an award of 
statutory damages under the Copyright Act.”123 
                                                                                                             
 118. See supra notes 98–117 and accompanying text (providing support for 
an application of the Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence to 
statutory damages). 
 119. See supra notes 98–117 (discussing the similarities between statutory 
and punitive damages awards). 
 120. See supra notes 98–117 (noting the similarities between statutory and 
punitive damages). 
 121. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61–62 (discussing the 
differences between punitive and statutory damages); see generally Tepp, supra 
note 6. 
 122. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61–62 (noting the 
differences between statutory and punitive damages); Tepp, supra note 6, at 93 
(insisting that “statutory damages are different from the punitive damages at 
issue in Gore, do not raise the policy concerns what were present in Gore, that 
the three-part test does not apply, and that even if that test were applied, the 
provisions of the Copyright Act would pass muster”). 
 123. Brief for United States in Opposition at *11, Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, 133 S. Ct. 1584 (2013) (No. 12-715).  
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Some scholars insist that the overriding factor leading to a 
more active standard of review in punitive damage cases is the 
lack of notice to the defendant regarding the potential 
punishment.124 In fact, this proposition finds support in the Gore 
opinion, as the Supreme Court highlighted that people must have 
notice of both the conduct that may lead to punishment and the 
severity of that punishment.125 But because the potential 
damages that one may incur pursuant to a statutory scheme are 
explicitly set forth in the statute, statutory damages schemes 
obviate constitutional concerns for notice.126 With punitive 
damages, however, the amount of the award has neither a floor 
nor a ceiling and only the discretion of the jury serves to limit it, 
however arbitrarily that discretion is exercised.127 Thus, people 
have absolutely no notice of the severity of punishment that they 
may incur in punitive damages cases.128 Those who find this 
distinction persuasive support continued application of the 
Williams standard of review to statutory damages awards.129 
A corollary to the lack of notice implicit in punitive damage 
awards is the unbridled discretion of juries to levy whatever 
amount of damages they consider proper.130 In Gore, Justice 
Breyer took care to highlight this concern.131 Relying on previous 
                                                                                                             
 124. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 60 (indicating that the 
overriding factor for the Supreme Court in Gore was the lack of notice to the 
defendant of the punishment that he incurred). 
 125. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 599, 574 (1996) 
(“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence 
dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject 
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.”). 
 126. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 60–61 (arguing that the 
existence of a statute specifically delineating a potential range of damages 
provides notice). 
 127. See id. (noting that punitive damages awards suffer from constitutional 
notice concerns). 
 128. See id. (highlighting the notice problems of punitive damages awards). 
 129. See, e.g., id. at 62 (noting that Gore should not apply to constitutional 
review of statutory damages awards). 
 130. See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (discussing the 
seemingly infinite latitude that juries have in assessing punitive damages 
awards). 
 131. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586–87 (1996) (Breyer, 
J. concurring) (highlighting the fairness concerns and constitutional issues 
surrounding a lack of standards to prevent juries from levying arbitrary awards 
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Supreme Court caselaw, Justice Breyer noted that the 
Constitution demands “legal standards that provide ‘reasonable 
constraints’ within which ‘discretion is exercised’” that permit 
adequate appellate review of the award.132 Further, Justice 
Breyer asserted that such legal standards do not require the 
utmost precision but merely must provide some constraint to 
prevent “purely arbitrary behavior.”133 One commentator urged 
that Justice Breyer’s opinion supports the inference that when 
legislation imposes “quantitative limits” on the verdict, the 
verdict merits “a strong presumption of validity.”134 Such 
commentators conclude that a range of damages from $750–
$150,000 sufficiently eradicates any problems of arbitrariness, 
and thus absolves the statutory damages schemes of 
constitutional encroachments that punitive damages sometimes 
cause.135 Thus, they conclude that the deferential Williams 
standard should apply instead of the Gore standard. 
Further, it is urged that courts should exhibit the utmost 
deference to congressional decisions regarding copyright law.136 
In a case regarding intellectual property law, albeit in a different 
factual context, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Supreme Court 
“has been . . . deferential to the judgment of Congress in the 
realm of copyright.”137 Indeed, because Congress possesses the 
explicit constitutional competence to legislate in the realm of 
copyright courts should not readily abrogate Congress’ judgments 
on such matters for fear of upsetting the structural integrity of 
the federal government established by the separation of 
powers.138 Therefore, they claim, the Gore guideposts should not 
apply to statutory damages awards, especially in the context of 
copyright. 
                                                                                                             
(quotations omitted) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20–21 
(1991))). 
 132. Id. at 587. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Morrissey, supra note 114, at 3090 (suggesting a particular reading 
of Breyer’s concurrence in Gore) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 586–77, 595).  
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 540(c)(1) (2012). 
 136. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 62 (noting that the proper 
amount of statutory damages available for copyright infringement in cases like 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset “are essentially legislative choices”). 
 137. Eldred v. Aschcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Finally, those who argue against applying the Gore 
guideposts to statutory damages contend that such an approach 
amounts to an attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole.139 
Therefore, the guideposts offer no workable approach to assessing 
the constitutionality of these awards anyway.140 The first 
guidepost, i.e., the “degree of reprehensibility” of the defendant’s 
conduct,141 might have some applicability.142 After all, one might 
argue that neither Tenenbaum nor Thomas-Rasset were 
completely innocent, but they also did not commit the most 
egregious of all copyright infringement.143 Ben Sheffner, however, 
called the utility of this assessment into question because 
concluding that their conduct falls somewhere in the middle of 
the reprehensibility spectrum is generally unhelpful.144 
Further, commentators insist that Gore’s second guidepost, 
the ratio between punitive and actual damages, is impossible to 
apply to statutory damages.145 Sheffner noted that in cases like 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset one cannot compare statutory 
and actual damages because measuring actual damages is 
impossible or at best difficult.146 After all, Congress created the 
right to elect statutory damages for cases in which copyright 
owners cannot prove actual damages even though an 
                                                                                                             
 139. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (“[A]ttempting to 
impose Gore’s rubric for analyzing punitive damages awards on copyright 
damages involves attempting to pound the proverbial square peg into a round 
hole.”). 
 140. See id. (noting that two of the guideposts do not analytically fit 
statutory damages and that although one can be applied, its application offers 
little to no help anyway). 
 141. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 142. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (conceding that the 
first guidepost may be applied in an analytically sound way). 
 143. See id. (“We can debate how ‘reprehensible’ infringers like Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum are; I agree that they aren’t the worst of the worst.”). 
 144. See id. (“But saying . . . [that Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset 
are] . . . in the mid-range of reprehensibility doesn’t tell us much about where in 
the statutory range the award should fall . . . .”). 
 145. See id. at 61 (noting that the second guide post does not “work at all 
with copyright statutory damages”); Tepp, supra note 6, at 97 (“Application of 
[the second guidepost] is problematic, at best.”). 
 146. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (“[I]t is impossible to 
compare actual to statutory damages because . . . it is difficult or impossible to 
measure actual damages.”); Tepp, supra note 6, at 97 (noting the impossibility of 
comparing actual damages to statutory damages). 
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infringement nonetheless occurred.147 Therefore, applying the 
second Gore guidepost would be unhelpful.148 
Moreover, the third guidepost, “the civil or criminal penalties 
that could be imposed for comparable misconduct,” has no 
relevance.149 After all, the statutory damages available are 
precisely “the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct.”150 Thus, an application of the third 
guidepost would amount to a comparison of the award levied with 
the statutory scheme pursuant to which the jury assessed the 
award.151 This, they argue, is nonsensical.152 
D. Gore Supplies the Proper Standard of Review for Statutory 
Damages in Peer-to-Peer Copyright Infringement Cases 
The due process concerns advanced by advocates for applying 
Gore to statutory damages in peer-to-peer infringement cases, 
coupled with the reasons against application of that standard set 
forth by Sheffner and Tepp, led one commentator to conclude that 
courts should assess the due process implications of these awards 
under a less deferentially applied Williams standard.153 The 
remainder of this Note will argue for an application of the Gore 
guideposts to statutory damages in peer-to-peer copyright 
infringement cases. To this end, this Note will set forth reasons 
                                                                                                             
 147. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (“Indeed, statutory 
damages exist in part to relieve copyright owners of the burden of proving up 
actual damages where, as a practical matter, they cannot.” (citing F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952))); Tepp, 
supra note 6, at 97 (“[T]he ratio of the harm suffered by the plaintiff to ‘punitive’ 
damages borders on the farcical where the statute is specifically designed to 
relieve the plaintiff of having to prove actual harm. It is an analysis that is 
precluded by the very nature of statutory damages.”). 
 148. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (concluding that the 
second guidepost should not apply); Tepp, supra note 6, at 97 (same). 
 149. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (noting that the third 
guidepost does not “work at all with copyright statutory damages”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. (arguing that the statutory damages pursuant to which the 
award was levied are the damages with which the award would be compared). 
 152. See id. (noting that attempting this comparison makes no sense). 
 153. See Morrissey, supra note 114, at 3088–104 (presenting arguments 
against the application of Gore to statutory damages and concluding that a more 
deferential Williams standard ought to apply). 
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that eliminate the concerns advanced by those who maintain that 
the Gore guideposts are analytically inapposite to statutory 
damages in copyright law.154 
Those who defend the continued application of Williams to 
the review of statutory damages in peer-to-peer infringement 
cases place great weight in the Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
notice in reviewing punitive damage awards.155 Legislation 
provides constructive notice of the potential penalty for copyright 
infringement.156 Therefore, the chief concern underlying Gore 
does not exist.157  
Admittedly, for Gore to apply, a lack of notice regarding the 
potential liability one might face in peer-to-peer copyright 
infringement cases must exist.158 But as much sense as the 
concept of constructive notice of a statute makes to one who has 
endured three years of law school, spent countless hours prepping 
for a bar examination, and engages daily in legal practice, the 
notion that one can have notice without actually having notice 
does not resonate well with the nonlawyer.159 One can argue that 
the average person, such as Tenenbaum or Thomas-Rasset, may 
hearken back to the days of taping a copy of a song from the radio 
                                                                                                             
 154. See infra notes 158–225 and accompanying text (arguing for an 
application of the Gore guideposts to statutory damages awards in peer-to-peer 
copyright infringement cases). 
 155. See Morrissey, supra note 114, at 3089 (noting that the notice problems 
which occur in punitive damages cases do not exist in statutory damages cases); 
Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 60 (“While it is true that the statutory 
range of $750 to $150,000 is broad, it is set forth in black and white at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504, and infringers have, at least, constructive notice of the penalties that may 
be imposed on them for their bad acts.”); Tepp, supra note 6, at 96 (“No serious 
contention can be made that there is a lack of notice . . . .”). 
 156. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 60 (asserting that 
infringing defendants have constructive notice of the potential penalties). 
 157. See supra notes 119–52 and accompanying text (offering the reasons set 
forth by those who do not support applying Gore to statutory damages cases). 
 158. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996) (noting 
that the three guideposts serve to assess whether BMW received “adequate 
notice of the magnitude of the sanction”). 
 159. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 908 n.1 
(“Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright laws apply to Internet 
activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for 
their conduct. Also, many infringers do not consider the current copyright 
infringement penalties a real threat . . . .” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 
(1999))). 
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and thus not consider himself on notice that he might incur up to 
$150,000 of liability per downloaded song when that song costs 
less than $1 to purchase simply because some law exists.160 Such 
defendants, however, probably do have notice that they 
unlawfully downloaded a song worth $1; they might reason that 
although some small penalty could theoretically result, it would 
probably never occur given the minimal cost to download a 
song.161  
The Supreme Court established the Gore guideposts to reflect 
precisely this reality.162 The first two guideposts, reprehensibility 
and the relationship between actual harm and the award 
assessed, stem from the commonsense notion that the penalty one 
might incur should bear some relationship to the nature of the 
conduct and the damage to the party harmed as a result of that 
conduct.163 Further, the third guidepost, which requires a 
comparison to other civil or criminal damages, provides a third 
way of alleviating the notice problems surrounding punitive 
damages.164 In short, the notice problems presented in punitive 
damages cases that Gore sought to alleviate stem from 
commonsense sensibilities regarding punishment as it relates to 
the conduct at issue.165 Similar concerns of notice emerge in peer-
to-peer copyright infringement cases when a teenager or 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 67 (“Constructive notice 
that a certain penalty may be awarded is, moreover, insufficient to shield 
awards from due process review.” (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 334 (1998) (finding a due process violation in the application of a forfeiture 
provision); Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 403–
09 (5th Cir. 2000) (reducing punitive damage award under equal employment 
laws even though it was below the statutory maximum))). 
 161. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 (1999) (noting that although internet 
users may be aware of the illegal nature of their activity they, they may not 
consider copyright infringement laws a threat). 
 162. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (noting that 
the guideposts serve to ensure “[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . that a 
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose”). 
 163. See id. (noting that “elementary notions of fairness” informed the 
adoption and application of the guideposts). 
 164. See id. (highlighting “[e]lementary notions of fairness” as the driving 
force behind an analysis under the three guideposts). 
 165. See id. (indicating that “[e]lementary notions of fairness” require 
assessment under the guideposts, implying that popular sentiments of fairness 
or justice are the constitutional concerns at issue). 
1972 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1941 (2013) 
homemaker downloads a song to save $1.166 Given the symmetry 
regarding constitutional concerns for notice in instances of 
punitive damages awards and statutory damages awards for 
peer-to-peer copyright infringements, the same due process 
concerns arise.167 Therefore, a closer analysis of applying the Gore 
guideposts to statutory damages awards in peer-to-peer copyright 
infringement cases will demonstrate how the guideposts can 
likewise alleviate these due process problems.168 
Those who argue against applying Gore to statutory damages 
awards in peer-to-peer copyright infringement insist that 
statutory damages exist for cases in which actual damages are 
difficult or impossible to determine.169 They buttress their 
position by relying on caselaw holding that statutory damages 
awards need not have any relationship to actual damages.170 
Gore, however, requires taking account of actual damages caused 
by the defendant’s conduct.171 Therefore, they argue, applying the 
Gore guideposts makes little sense. This reasoning is flawed. 
First, the legislative history of the Copyright Act does not support 
their position because it contemplates that a plaintiff need not 
prove actual damages and thus may rely on the statutorily 
authorized minimum.172 This suggests that Congress did not 
intend for the statutory damages range to provide juries with 
                                                                                                             
 166. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 (1999) (discussing the mindset of the 
average internet user with respect to copyright law). 
 167. See supra notes 98–118 and accompanying text (discussing the support 
for applying Gore to constitutional review of statutory damages). 
 168. See infra notes 169–225 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
guideposts provide the proper standard by which to assess the constitutionality 
of statutory damages awards in peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases). 
 169. See, e.g., Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (“[I]t is impossible 
to compare actual to statutory damages because, as noted above, it is difficult or 
impossible to measure actual damages.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Morrissey, supra note 114, at 3096–97 (“Since Williams, the 
Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of a statutory damage award 
is not to be judged by comparing it to the actual injury suffered.” (citing St. 
Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919))). 
 171. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (identifying 
“the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his 
punitive damages award” as the second guidepost). 
 172. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1975) (noting that a plaintiff may 
rely on the statutory minimum instead of attempting to prove actual damages in 
a copyright infringement suit). 
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unbridled discretion within that range.173 Indeed, this language 
suggests that the statutory minimum should serve as the default 
award absent hard evidence of greater harm to the contrary.174 
Furthermore, Congress raised the statutory minimum in 1999 to 
$750 per infringement to combat illegal file-sharing, implying 
that they thought the $750 minimum would rectify the 
problem.175 Because proponents of continued application of the 
Williams standard place enormous emphasis on the omnipresent 
constructive notice that statutes supposedly provide, their 
inattention to the notice provided in the legislative history is 
perplexing.176 If defendants have notice of a statute, then they 
would likewise have notice of the purposes that Congress 
articulated for that statute.177 Defendants illegally downloading 
songs for $1 should have notice of damages amounting only to 
$750 unless they decide to start counterfeiting those songs and 
selling them for profit.178 Thus, levying an exorbitant award of 
statutory damages against an infringing defendant in the peer-to-
peer file-sharing context gives rise to the same constitutional 
notice concerns as excessive punitive damages awards.179 To 
argue otherwise betrays a dubious evasion of the Constitution by 
way of legal formalism.180 
                                                                                                             
 173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting the legislative 
history with respect to statutory damages in the Copyright Act). 
 174. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (highlighting 
congressional intent with respect to statutory damages in the Copyright Act). 
 175. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 55 (noting that the 
minimum award of $750 is consistent with congressional intent (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 106-216, at 2–3 (1999))). 
 176. See e.g., Tepp, supra note 6, at 96 (arguing that statutory notice 
precludes due process concerns without referencing the legislative history 
indicating that Congress contemplated an award of the statutory minimum for 
cases in which a plaintiff does not offer proof of actual harm). 
 177. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (providing the relevant 
legislative history). 
 178. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition 
that absent a showing of actual damages, courts should levy only the statutory 
minimum). 
 179. See supra notes 158–68 and accompanying text (discussing the notice 
concerns presented by statutory damages schemes). 
 180. See supra notes 172–79 and accompanying text (discussing the realities 
of notice concerns in peer-to-peer infringement cases resulting in statutory 
damages awards without resorting to legal formalism). 
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One might object, however, to the argument that defendants 
in peer-to-peer infringement cases only cause less than $1 of 
harm to record companies.181 Such an objector would posit that 
the defendants in such cases not only downloaded copyrighted 
works but also distributed them to other users.182 Therefore, 
because other file-sharers downloaded the songs from the 
defendants’ share folders, those defendants caused far more than 
$1 in harm.183 This objection, however, stems from a 
mischaracterization of a defendant’s conduct in a peer-to-peer 
infringement case by implying that the defendant actively took 
measures to distribute the copyrighted works.184 An illegally 
downloaded song gets stored in a “share” folder by default.185 
Files stored in the share folder are available for download to 
other members of the peer-to-peer network.186 In other words, 
when one downloads a song through the peer-to-peer network, 
the peer-to-peer software automatically makes it available to 
others on the network without the downloader taking any 
additional steps.187 The implication that a defendant in a peer-to-
peer infringement case somehow actively harmed a record 
                                                                                                             
 181. See Morrissey, supra note 114, at 3097 (“[D]efendants in the RIAA’s 
copyright infringement suits have not just been sued for downloading songs 
instead of buying them—they have also been sued for distributing songs 
illegally.” (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 
(D. Minn. 2008) (noting that Thomas-Rasset was sued for downloading and 
distributing copyrighted songs))); Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 60 
(“Though it is tempting to say that an infringer who used KaZaA to obtain a 
song that costs ninety-nine cents on iTunes caused no more than ninety-nine 
cents in actual damages, such an analysis would be flawed . . . [because 
it] . . .  ignores the distribution or ‘sharing’ engaged in by peer-to-peer users.”). 
 182. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (noting the objection that 
because peer-to-peer infringers make songs available for download, they cause 
more than nominal damages). 
 183. See supra notes 182–83 (noting that peer-to-peer downloading causes 
significant actual damages). 
 184. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 6–7 (noting that 
Thomas-Rasset simply left the music in the default folder in which the peer-to-
peer software stores downloaded material). 
 185. See id. (noting that the Kazaa software stores downloaded files in a 
share folder by default). 
 186. See id. (noting that “other Kazaa users could download” from the share 
folder). 
 187. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (noting that making a 
song available in a share folder on a peer-to-peer system requires no conduct 
subsequent to downloading the file). 
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company through “distribution” of copyrighted sound recordings 
predicates the liability of the defendant upon default settings in 
software that someone else created.188 This hardly seems 
sensible, let alone fair.189 
E. How to Apply the Gore Guideposts to Statutory Damages 
Awards in Peer-to-Peer Copyright Infringement Suits 
Because an excessively high award of statutory damages in a 
peer-to-peer copyright infringement suit presents the same 
concerns about “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence” regarding fair notice,190 the Gore 
guideposts should apply. In light of the objections raised 
regarding the analytical feasibility of applying the Gore 
guideposts, the remainder of this Note will address how courts 
should apply the analytical framework of Gore to statutory 
damages awards in peer-to-peer copyright infringement suits. 
1. Applying the First Guidepost: Reprehensibility of Defendant’s 
Conduct 
Commentators agree that courts could logically apply the 
reprehensibility guidepost articulated in Gore.191 Disagreement 
emerges, however, over the degree of reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s conduct in a peer-to-peer infringement case.192 
Sheffner argues that such a defendant is not innocent, but 
                                                                                                             
 188. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text (noting that making a 
downloaded file available on a peer-to-peer network requires no affirmative 
action). 
 189. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari supra note 99, at 7–8 (noting that the 
district court concluded sua sponte “that merely making the songs available on a 
peer-to-peer network, without proof of actual distribution to a third party, was 
[not] distribution”). 
 190. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
 191. See, e.g., Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61, 66 (conceding 
that the first guidepost could apply and highlighting the agreement regarding 
its application to copyright cases). 
 192. See infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text (noting scholarly 
disagreement over the applicability of the first Gore guidepost). 
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neither is he terribly egregious.193 Therefore, the degree of 
reprehensibility falls somewhere in the middle of the statutory 
damages scheme.194 Sheffner asserts that this is unhelpful 
because concluding that the conduct falls between the extremes 
does little to help determine precisely where the award should 
fall within the range.195 Tepp, another defender of the Williams 
standard, argues that a reprehensibility analysis under Gore 
overlaps with determining whether the infringement amounted 
to willful infringement.196 Therefore, “an enhanced award is 
supported.”197  
Samuelson agrees that defendants like Tenenbaum and 
Thomas-Rasset “are far from innocent or inadvertent 
infringers.”198 But she notes that such defendants do not reach 
the degree of reprehensibility of professional counterfeiters who 
profit from the distribution and sales of unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted material.199 Insightfully, she recognizes that 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset “were merely young and foolish, 
not commercial counterfeiters; they merely enjoyed the songs 
they downloaded and shared, not sold them to others for 
profit.”200 Therefore, the reprehensibility of Tenenbaum’s and 
Thomas-Rasset’s conduct was minimal at best; their conduct did 
not justify such an exorbitant award.201 
                                                                                                             
 193. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (agreeing that 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset “aren’t the worst of the worst” in terms of 
reprehensibility). 
 194. See id. (suggesting that the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct of 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset places their damages somewhere between the 
two extremes in the statutory scheme). 
 195. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (“But saying, for 
example, that they’re in the mid-range of reprehensibility doesn’t tell us much 
about where in the statutory range the award should fall . . . .”). 
 196. See Tepp, supra note 6, at 97 (“[T]he reprehensibility of the act prong 
overlaps with the willful standard for the award of an enhanced level of 
statutory damages.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 57. 
 199. See id. (noting that the level of reprehensibility was low). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See supra notes 191–200 and accompanying text (noting the 
disagreement among scholars with respect to the applicability of the 
reprehensibility guidepost to statutory damages awards in peer-to-peer 
copyright infringement cases); see also infra note 202 and accompanying text 
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Given the disagreement over the reprehensibility of file-
sharing infringement, scholars probably will not reach a 
consensus in the near future.202 Here, the important point is that 
courts can apply the reprehensibility guidepost in an analytically 
sound way.203 In response to Sheffner’s proposition that a 
reprehensibility analysis does not yield much in the way of 
finding the right award within the statutory range, one can 
assert that the law abounds with malleable standards such as 
“reasonableness” and “unconscionability” that lawyers litigate 
over adeptly.204 Further, because reprehensibility serves to 
provide a standard in the face of punitive damages, which have 
no range to begin with, there is no reason why it could not do 
similar work within a statutory damages scheme.205 And Tepp’s 
conflation of reprehensibility with willfulness betrays a 
misunderstanding of the specialized meaning of willfulness that 
Congress originally intended.206 In any event, application of the 
reprehensibility guidepost would at least permit defendants like 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset to present arguments in support 
of an award’s unconstitutionality.207 Because their infringing 
conduct was “merely young and foolish,” they could make a strong 
case for a low level of reprehensibility.208 At the very least, due 
process requires that defendants have the opportunity to make 
such arguments.209 
                                                                                                             
(same). 
 202. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scholarly disagreement over the applicability of the first guidepost). 
 203. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text (noting the analytical 
propriety of applying the first guidepost to statutory damages in peer-to-peer 
copyright infringement cases). 
 204. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 61 (concluding that 
characterizing a defendant’s conduct as somewhere in the middle of the 
statutory damages scheme does not help determine what award to levy). 
 205. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (noting the 
“considerable flexibility” that states have in assessing an award of punitive 
damages). 
 206. Supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text (noting that defendants 
could avail themselves of reasonable arguments regarding a statutory damages 
award’s unconstitutionality). 
 208. Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 20, at 56. 
 209. See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text (noting the arguments 
that one can raise with respect to the due process issue). 
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2. Applying the Second Guidepost: Ratio of Damages Awarded to 
Actual Harm Inflicted on Plaintiff 
As discussed previously, some argue that statutory damages 
exist for cases in which determining actual damages is difficult or 
impossible.210 But this Note has argued that in the case of peer-
to-peer copyright infringements, defendants harm record 
companies to the tune of less than $1 per infringement.211 In any 
event, this Note also emphasized that Congress raised the 
statutory minimum to $750 with peer-to-peer infringements in 
mind.212 An award of a ratio of 750:1 should sufficiently 
compensate record companies and deter infringers.213 Absent 
some extraordinary conduct by a defendant in such a case, courts 
should not permit an award above the statutory minimum 
because, as the Supreme Court noted in the context of punitive 
damages awards, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio . . . 
will satisfy due process.”214 
3. Applying the Third Guidepost: Sanctions for Comparable 
Misconduct 
Applying Gore’s third guidepost, civil or criminal sanctions 
for comparable misconduct, presents a greater analytical 
                                                                                                             
 210. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 908 (8th 
Cir. 2012); see also Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 502 
(1st Cir. 2011) (“Section 504’s text reflects Congress’s intent ‘to give the owner of 
a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of 
law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits.’” 
(quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935))); GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 23, § 14.2 (“The rationale commonly given for statutory damages is that, 
because actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a 
statutory award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their 
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download). 
 212. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing the 
congressional intent with respect to raising the statutory minimum to $750). 
 213. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 
(2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages will satisfy due process.”). 
 214. Id.  
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challenge because “statutory damages are the civil . . . penalties 
that Congress has chosen to impose on copyright infringers.”215 
But this overstates the problem. The application of the third 
guidepost among the lower courts in the punitive damages 
context varies.216 Some lower courts have gone so far as to 
disregard the third guidepost altogether,217 while others have 
insisted that the third guidepost requires determining whether a 
defendant had notice of the potential liability instead of a mere 
comparison to some existent statutory range of penalties.218 Some 
commentators maintain that the focus of the analysis under the 
third guidepost should determine whether the legislature 
carefully “calibrated the statutory damage provisions to achieve 
just results.”219 
Further, Samuelson has highlighted that Thomas-Rasset and 
Tenenbaum may have fared better if instead they had been 
charged with criminal copyright infringement.220 In a criminal 
case, they would have had all of the heightened due process 
protection in provided by criminal law, the benefit of a more 
demanding standard of proof, and the available penalty could not 
have exceeded $250,000.221 Considering the exorbitant awards 
levied in Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset relative to the criminal 
copyright penalties, one may question whether the civil copyright 
statutory damages scheme bespeaks a criminal character.222 In 
any event, given the liberal application of the third guidepost, 
and the existence of criminal penalties for similar misconduct, 
courts could certainly apply the third guidepost in an analytically 
sound manner.223 
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V. Conclusion 
In the final analysis, Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset 
incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars of liability for conduct 
which most—if not all—current law students engaged in on a 
daily basis as sixth graders. Admittedly, this does not relieve 
Tenenbaum, Thomas-Rasset, or anyone else of culpability for 
unlawful acts. But it certainly does not follow that because one 
partook in the craze of peer-to-peer music sharing in its early 
heyday, one should therefore face such magnitudinous penalties 
that forever bar one from owning a home in which one might one 
day raise a family. Indeed, this seems to be what Gore was all 
about when the majority opinion invoked “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence.”224 
Elementary notions of fairness suggest that awards like those in 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset violate due process. Thomas-
Rasset’s petition for writ of certiorari effectively captures this 
sentiment: 
This is not just. It is unfair, it is not due process, for an 
industry to sue 12,500 people and threaten to sue 5,000 more, 
wielding a statute for which they lobbied, under which they 
can threaten hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in 
statutory damages, where the only way to resist is through 
modern, complex, expensive federal process, so that the only 
reasonable choice is to pay the settlement and be done. That’s 
extortion, not law. We cannot govern that way.”225 
                                                                                                             
statutory damages in copyright law). 
 224. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
 225. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 99, at 23. 
